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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 
This study aims to assess the development effectiveness of the Paris Declaration 
(2005). Using data collected by the OECD/DAC from 78 developing countries for the 
period 2005~2010, this study evaluates the role played by the Paris Declaration 
principles alone and in interaction with aid in promoting per-capita GDP growth. 
The analysis shows that the overall net impact of aid on promoting economic 
growth has been negative. However, aid effectiveness has been enhanced by the 
sound policies or institutions and some Paris Declaration (PD) principles. Of the five 
principles of the PD, only the alignment and, to some extent, mutual accountability 
principles of the PD did show a significant and positive role in making aid more 
effective for economic growth of aid recipient countries. Therefore, OECD’s 
statement that the PD enhances aid effectiveness is supported only partially. 
These findings have significant implications for the importance accorded to sound 
policies and institutions in the growth literature, and for future international 
development cooperation agenda. 
 
 
 
 
본 연구는 파리선언(2005)의 개발효과를 평가하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 구체적으로 말하면, 
OECD/DAC가 78개의 개도국으로부터 수집한 2005~10년 기간의 자료를 이용하여, 파리선언의 
여러 원칙이 독자적으로 또는 원조와의 상호작용을 통하여 1인당 국민소득의 성장에 기여한 정
도를 평가한다.  
본 연구의 결과에 의하면, 원조가 독자적으로 국민소득의 증가에 기여한 효과는 부정적이다. 
그러나 건전한 정책과 제도가 있는 개도국 또는 파리선언의 몇 가지 원칙이 실시된 국가에서는 
원조의 효과가 긍정적이었다. 파리선언의 다섯 가지 원칙 중에서 오직 원조가 개도국의 개발전
략과 계획에 연계되어야 한다는 원칙이 적용된 경우와 원조공여국-수원국 상호 간에 상호책임
의 원칙이 적용된 경우에는 원조가 경제성장에 긍정적이며 유효한 영향을 미쳤다는 것을 보여
준다. 따라서 파리선언의 원칙들이 원조의 효과성을 제고한다는 OECD의 주장은 오직 부분적으
로만 실증된 셈이다. 
원조와 파리선언의 개발효과에 관한 이러한 실증적 분석 결과는 건전한 제도나 정책이 경제성
장에 중요하다는 경제학 문헌의 주장과 앞으로의 국제개발협력의 논의과제에 주는 의미가 크다.  
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. In particular, it examines the claim that adopting the declaration’s 
principles helps promote developing countries’ economic growth.  
At the Second Hi-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris (2005), more than 
180 Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting 
development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development agencies resolved 
to take far-reaching reform of the ways they deliver and manage aid. They also 
agreed on 12 action indicators and targets to be attained by 2010. OECD claims that 
this Declaration builds on the lessons learned over many years about what works. It 
also claims that donors and recipients are committed to adopt the best policies and 
principles in aid management to increase the impact that aid has in reducing poverty 
and inequality, and increasing growth of developing countries (OECD, 2009).  
The Declaration incorporated five principles: establishment of the country 
ownership of development policies and strategies; alignment of donor aid to 
developing countries’ priorities and systems in a predictable and transparent manner; 
donor efforts to harmonize aid practices; results-oriented aid management; and 
mutual accountability by both donors and recipients (Paris High Level Forum, 2005).   
In preparation for the Fourth High Level Meeting on Aid Effectiveness in Busan 
(2011), the OECD published a progress report on the Paris Declaration’s 
implementation. It said that considerable progress had been made toward many of 
the 12 targets, with one (ownership) being fully met, and noted significant variation 
in the direction and pace of progress among donors and recipients (OECD, 2011).  
However, as yet, there have been no evaluation studies of the Paris Declaration’s 
impact on either poverty reduction or economic growth. Moreover, the OECD’s 
claim that adoption of the Declaration’s five principles of aid management would 
promote economic growth and reduce poverty and inequality has never been tested 
empirically. This study aims to fill this gap in aid effectiveness debates and 
determine whether the Paris Declaration has made any positive contribution to aid 
effectiveness and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Such 
evaluation is important when post-MDG policies and strategies are being actively 
discussed by both developed and developing country governments, as well as 
international development agencies. If the five principles of the Paris Declaration 
were proved to be effective in promoting aid effectiveness and economic growth, 
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they could be credited to continue playing important role in the post-MDG era. 
However, to date there has been no empirical proof that the Paris Declaration has 
facilitated aid effectiveness. Moreover, until the Paris Declaration was agreed upon 
in 2005, there had been running debates in the literature on aid effectiveness or on 
the causes of aid ineffectiveness. These topics are still one of the most hotly debated 
subjects in the literature of development economics. Therefore, this study evaluates 
empirically whether the Paris Declaration has actually facilitated aid’s impact on 
development. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second section reviews the 
literature on aid effectiveness, highlighting the significance of the Paris Declaration 
in quelling the debate over aid management; the third section describes the method 
and data of the empirical test adopted in this study; the fourth section discusses the 
findings of the empirical evaluation; and the last section provides concluding 
remarks and recommendations. 
 
 
Ⅱ. Literature Review 
 
 
Numerous empirical studies have confirmed that economic growth is necessary 
for sustained improvement of human welfare and poverty reduction (Dollar and 
Kraay, 2002). Consensus seems to have been largely achieved on the positive role 
played for economic growth by investment in fixed assets, human capital, policies 
and institutions, trade, and foreign direct investment. However, scholars disagree on 
other causes of economic growth.  
One dispute is over whether foreign aid can spur developing countries’ economic 
growth. Cross-country studies have tended to yield ambiguous, sometimes even 
conflicting results. They also differ in the econometric specifications used, the 
number of years covered in the analysis, the independent variables included, and the 
number of countries investigated in the studies. Time-series country studies also 
failed to produce any conclusive results. Both cross-country and time-series 
literature on aid effectiveness can be divided into two groups: one which argues in 
favor of aid effectiveness, and the other which argues against aid effectiveness 
(Hussen and Lee, 2012). 
  
1. Studies in Favor of Aid Effectiveness 
 
The studies that favor aid effectiveness for economic growth are represented by 
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Papanek (1973), Hansen and Tarp (2000 and 2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), 
Gomanee et al. (2005), and Arndt et al. (2010). The most controversial studies are 
the ones made by the World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (2000). These 
studies show that aid is ineffective for per-capita GDP growth in general, but is 
effective in a sound policy and institutional environment. In other words, aid alone 
is not effective for economic growth, but becomes effective when it interacts with 
sound policies  
Critics argued that these studies’ results are very much dependent on the data and 
specifications of estimation models and that the policy concept is too narrow 
(Hansen and Tarp, 2000 and 2001; and Easterly et al., 2003). However, these results, 
particularly the significant and positive aid-policy interaction effects, are 
reconfirmed even with a broader concept of policy (i.e., CPIA), refined aid data, and 
specifications (Collier and Dollar, 2002). On the basis of these reconfirmed results, 
the Collier and Dollar study demonstrates that assistance would be more effective if 
more aid were allocated to countries with lower income and sounder policies. Later 
studies such as Clemens et al. (2004) find that aid effectiveness is not conditional on 
policies, but that aid becomes more effective in developing countries with sounder 
policies and higher levels of human capital accumulation. 
The Paris Declaration principles are a kind of sound policies and institutions for 
managing aid and aid relationships. Therefore, this study evaluates whether aid 
becomes effective or more effective when aid donors and recipients have adopted 
the Paris Declaration principles as part of sound policies and institutions.    
 
2. Studies Against Aid Effectiveness 
 
The studies that argue against aid effectiveness can be divided into three 
subgroups by the identified causes of ineffectiveness. The first argues that aid is 
ineffective due to conditions and constraints in developing countries; the second 
blames the very nature of the donor-recipient relationship; and the third targets the 
constraints and incentive systems of donor countries (Paul, 2006). They argue that 
each of these factors prevents aid from being placed in investment or consumption 
that can be used effectively for growth and poverty reduction. 
 
A. Recipient Constraints 
Boone (1996) investigated the impact of foreign aid on investment, consumption, 
and measures of well-being of 91 countries for the period 1971~1990. He found that 
aid increased consumption more than investment and growth. Boone argued that the 
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current political regimes in recipient countries prevent aid from being an effective 
tool for promoting growth, and that a liberal political regime is important for growth 
promotion and poverty reduction through aid. Since government is not 
representative and serves particular interest groups (through distortionary taxes), aid 
becomes distorted to serve the interest groups. Therefore, poverty reduction and 
human development do not improve. Other studies follow more or less the same line 
of argument (Adam and O’Connell, 1999; Pedersen, 1995; Svensson, 2000; Lahiri 
and Raimondos-Møller, 2004).  
Ovaska (2003) studied 86 developing countries over the period 1975~1998 and 
found a negative relationship between aid and economic growth mainly because the 
aid-policy interaction term turned out to be consistently negative. In other words, 
giving more aid to countries with good policies and institutions worked against 
economic growth. The author suspects that aid may have played a role against the 
work efforts of the recipient countries or donors must have tied the use of the aid 
against growth. In contrast to earlier studies, the author used a broader measure of 
policy and institution, two alternative concepts of aid, and a fixed effect least 
squares model.  
Rajan and Subramanian (2005 and 2007) also failed to find any positive effects 
of aid on economic growth in the short and medium terms, and even found a 
negative relationship in the long run. They suspect that aid might reduce the quality 
of governance since aid inflows might reduce the need for governments to tax the 
governed or enlist their cooperation. 
 
B. Agency Problems in Aid Relationship 
Kanbur and Sandler (1999) and other studies (Azam and Laffont, 2003; Dixit, 
2003; Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Martens et al., 2002; Seabright, 2002) argue 
that as with a principal and agent contract, a donor and recipient relationship 
produces conflicting views on the objective of aid (desirability of poverty reduction), 
divergent interests, and asymmetric information. Consequently, donors and 
recipients typically have mismatched incentives, broken information feedback, and a 
reluctance to collaborate toward institutional reform. 
To overcome such a dysfunctional relationship, the studies suggest that 
conditionality be used in all types of aid, or that all bilateral aid be pooled and 
entrusted to a multilateral aid agency for objective and optimal allocation to all 
eligible developing countries (Kanbur, 2003). However, records have shown 
problems with conditionality aid: donor-designed projects depriving recipients of 
ownership, moral hazards and adverse selection, cooperation among donors 
producing crowding-out effects, weakening donors’ commitment, incomplete 
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enforcement of conditionality, and ultimately shaken credibility of conditionality 
(Svensson, 2003; Pedersen, 2001).  
Therefore, some studies argue for ex-post conditionality in contrast to traditional 
ex-ante conditionality, favoring aid for sector and budget support programs, or 
linking aid allocations to observed outputs or results (Adam et al., 2004; Nissanke, 
2008). Without a doubt, aid with ex-post conditionality enhances the predictability 
of aid allocations, ownership of recipients, and sounder donor-recipient relationships. 
However, performance-based aid allocations and aid with ex-post conditionality also 
have encountered problems with recipients’ limited absorptive capacity and have 
created a high level of aid volatility (Eifert and Gelb, 2005).  
 
C. Donor’s Constraints 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) attribute aid ineffectiveness to historical relations, 
such as that of a donor country to a former colony, and to donors’ strategic 
behaviors. The strategic behaviors include not only exchange of political gifts by 
governments at international negotiations (Lundborg, 1998), but also enterprises’ 
lobbying activities to pursue economic and commercial interests in recipient 
countries (Villanger, 2006). Some studies attribute aid ineffectiveness to the failure 
of bureaucracy in allocating aid optimally and closely monitoring and evaluating 
execution of aid projects and programs (Easterly, 2003).  
 
D. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
Adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 was based on the 
realization that aid ineffectiveness was caused by a combination of failures on the 
part of both donors and recipients. Such realization was fostered through discussions 
at the First High Level Forum on Harmonization in Rome in 2003 and at the 
Roundtable on Managing for Development Results in Marrakech in 2004.  
As mentioned before, the Paris Declaration incorporated five principles derived 
from the past failures of both donors and recipients. The principles sought to 
encourage both donors and recipients to collaborate on enhancing aid effectiveness 
and be mutually accountable on aid management. These principles of the Paris 
Declaration takes into account the earlier argument that emphasized the agency 
problem in the donor-recipient relationship. Recipients are urged to take greater 
ownership of development policies and strategies; donors are urged to coordinate 
and harmonize aid efforts with recipients and other donors. These principles of the 
Paris Declaration aim to overcome the past criticisms that highlighted either only the 
recipients’ constraints or only the donors’ problems.  
Under the OECD’s auspices, more than 180 representatives of donors and 
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recipients established 12 indicators and action targets to be achieved by 2007 and 
2010 to assess progress on the five principles of the Paris Declaration. These 12 
indicators were: operational development strategies, reliable public financial 
management systems, reliable procurement systems, alignment of aid flows with 
national priorities, coordinated support, use of recipient-country public financial 
management systems, use of recipient-country procurement systems, avoidance of 
parallel project implementation, aid predictability, untied aid, use of common 
arrangements or procedures, joint missions and joint country analytic work, results-
oriented frameworks, and mutual accountability. 
In the end, 78 countries voluntarily agreed to participate in the monitoring 
program, and the monitored results were published at the mid-term review in 2008 
(Clay et al., 2008) and the completion review in 2011 (OECD, 2011). The OECD 
promoted the Declaration, saying that it enhances aid effectiveness and contributes 
to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Unfortunately, one 
critical shortcoming of the Declaration is that more than eight years after the launch 
of the Paris Declaration, there has been no evaluation of the agreement’s impact on 
either economic growth or poverty reduction through aid.  
Such an assessment can be made by following the methods and procedures of the 
proponents of aid effectiveness. The hypothesis to be tested is that aid is ineffective 
in general, but is effective in an environment where the five principles of the Paris 
Declaration are prevalent. An alternative hypothesis is that aid is effective in general, 
but is more effective in an environment where the Paris Declaration principles are 
actively practiced. To test these hypotheses, we can also adopt a growth equation 
that includes not only aid, but also an interactive term between aid and the Paris 
Declaration Indicators, following the precedent analyses with an interactive term 
between aid and policy (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002).  
Another shortcoming of the Paris Declaration is that it does not include any 
principles related to the rational or optimal allocation of aid. Although several 
studies have pointed out irrational or suboptimal aid allocation practices for historic, 
strategic, or commercial reasons (Alensina and Dollar, 2000), the Paris Declaration 
does not include any principles that can serve to improve this area. Some studies 
bear out the trend of more selective aid allocations in line with optimal aid allocation 
criteria since the end of the Cold War (Dollar and Levin, 2004; Bandyopadhyay and 
Wall, 2007). However, more recent studies show that suboptimal aid allocation 
practices are still rampant (Lee, 2012a and b). If the aid allocation is distorted at the 
early stage of an aid cycle, no efforts to improve aid management at later stages will 
be able to enhance aid effectiveness much.  
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Ⅲ. Empirical Evaluation Method and Data 
 
 
The basic specification of the growth equations used in this study is as follows: 
 
gPCGDPit = a + b1 IPCGDPit + b2 (Inv/GDP)it + b3 HC it + b4 (Export/GDP)it  
+ b5 (FDI/GDP)it +b6 (Aid/GDP)it + b7 (Aid/GDP)it2 + b8 CPIAit  
+ b9 (Aid/GDP)it*CPIAit + b10 ICRGit + b11 (Aid/GDP)it*ICRGit  
+ b12 Popit + b13 PDit + b14 (Aid/GDP)it*PDit + eit                      (1) 
 
gPCGDPit = a + b1 IPCGDPit + b2 (Inv/GDP)it + b3 HC it + b4 (Export/GDP)it  
+ b5 (FDI/GDP)it + b6 (Aid/GDP)it + b7 (Aid/GDP)it2 + b8 CPIAit  
+ b9 (Aid/GDP)it*CPIAit + b10 ICRG + b11 (Aid/GDP)it*ICRGit  
+ b12 Popit +b13 PD-1it + b14 (Aid/GDP)it*PD-1it + b15 PD-2it   
+ b16 (Aid/GDP)it*PD-2it + b17 PD-3it + B18 (Aid/GDP)it*PD-3it  
+ b19 PD-4it + b120 (Aid/GDP)it*PD-4it + b21 PD-5it  
+ b22 (Aid/GDP)it*PD-5it + eit                                              (2) 
  
where  
i and t: country and year (during 2005~2010), 
gPCGDP: growth rates of per capita real GDP in constant 2005 US $ prices, 
IPCGDP: initial per capita real GDP in constant 2005 US $ prices, 
Inv/GDP: the ratio of investment to GDP (%), 
HC: the secondary education enrollment rate (% of age group) as a proxy for human 
capital, 
Aid/GDP: the ratio of Aid to GDP (%) where Aid is defined as official development 
assistance, 
(Aid/GDP)2: square of Aid/GDP, 
CPIA: proxy index of macroeconomic and social protection policies, 
(Aid/GDP)*CPIA: an interactive term between the aid ratio and policy, 
ICRG: proxy index of the institutional quality, 
(AID/GDP)*ICRG: an interactive term between the aid ratio and institutional quality, 
Pop: population growth rate, 
Export/GDP: the ratio between exports and GDP (%), 
FDI/GDP: the ratio between FDI inflows and GDP (%), 
PD: a composite index of Paris Declaration principles (%), which is a simple 
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average of five subcomponent indexes: PD-1, PD-2, PD-3, PD-4, and PD-5, 
(Aid/GDP)*PD: an interactive term between the aid ratio and the PD, 
PD-1: the Paris Declaration Indicator for the ownership principle (%), 
PD-2: the Paris Declaration Indicator for the alignment principle (%), 
PD-3: the Paris Declaration Indicator for the harmonization principle (%), 
PD-4: the Paris Declaration Indicator for the results principle (%), 
PD-5: the Paris Declaration Indicator for the mutual accountability principle (%), 
(Aid/GDP)*PD-1: an interactive term between the aid ratio and PD-1, 
(Aid/GDP)*PD-2: an interactive term between the aid ratio and PD-2, 
(Aid/GDP)*PD-3: an interactive term between the aid ratio and PD-3, 
(Aid/GDP)*PD-4: an interactive term between the aid ratio and PD-4, 
(Aid/GDP)*PD-5: an interactive term between the aid ratio and PD-5, 
e: an error term. 
 
Since the main objective of aid (Official Development Assistance: ODA) in this 
millennium era is understood as poverty reduction, the development effectiveness of 
the Paris Declaration should also be explored from the poverty reduction point of 
view. However, this study focuses on the economic growth objective of aid for two 
reasons. First, although poverty can be reduced by aid for delivering consumption 
goods directly to the poverty group, a more sustainable way of reducing poverty is 
to use aid for investment to promote pro-poor growth of the whole economy 
including the poverty group. Second, an effective way of exploring the development 
effect of the Paris Declaration is to collect data from the countries, which 
participated voluntarily in the monitoring and evaluation process of the Declaration. 
However, poverty indicators are not uniformly defined and compiled in those 
participating countries for every year. In terms of data, it is much easier and more 
reliable to compare the economic growth performance of the participating countries. 
Therefore, this study focuses on exploring the economic growth effects of the Paris 
Declaration. 
The growth equations as specified above draw on the large empirical literature on 
growth. Of course, the current literature on growth, especially the cross-country 
regression method for accounting growth, has several limitations. First, the cross-
country regressions typically include control variables (such as investment and 
human capital) that are associated with transition dynamics as well as with steady-
state income, making it hard to say that the magnitude of the coefficient on initial 
income picks up all transition dynamics. Second, the models do not use observable 
control variables that will fully capture differences in steady states. Third, the 
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control variables (for example, aid) often cannot avoid the endogeneity problem vis-
à-vis growth (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997). However, the main concern of 
this study is not to account for the speed of growth or convergence, but to explore 
the contribution of the Paris Declaration principles to aid effectiveness in promoting 
growth. Therefore, this study simply takes advantage of the cross-country regression 
method, accepting its limitations and avoiding the main controversy among different 
growth models. This study does not use the pure cross-country regression method, 
but adopts a cross-country and time-series panel regression method, controlling for 
differences in steady states among countries. Also, this study use proper 
econometric techniques to avoid the edogeneity problem between some control 
variables and growth.   
The two equations above allow growth rates during the study period to depend on 
the initial level of GDP per capita, so that the model can measure the conditional 
rate of conversion of the economy to its long-run steady-state position. Based on the 
neo-classical economic growth model, the coefficient on this variable is expected to 
be negative, i.e., the higher the initial income level, the lower the growth rate.  
The general strategy of the model is to account for policy and institutional 
distortions in developing countries in view of the emphasis placed on these factors 
in the growth literature. For this purpose, this study uses the Country Performance 
and Institution Assessment (CPIA) and the International Country Risk Guidance 
(ICRG) Indexes. The CPIA index measures soundness of macroeconomic and social 
protection policies of a country. The CPIA, compiled by the World Bank, has 20 
equally weighted components, each ranking all countries ordinally from one through 
six, which indicates the best performance. This policy index is expected to show 
positive effects on growth, as in the earlier empirical studies (Burnside and Dollar, 
2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002).  
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which captures the institutional 
quality, measures long-term characteristics of a country that affect both growth 
performance and policy. This study adds only three scores among many sub-
categories of the composite index: corruption (0~6 scores), law and order (0~6 
scores), and bureaucracy quality (0~4 scores). All three components are clearly 
linked to governance, highly relevant for development issues, and scaled so that a 
higher level indicates a better quality. Like the policy variable, this institutional 
quality variable is expected to show positive effects on growth, as in the earlier 
studies. Another such explanatory variable is population growth rates, which may 
affect per capita GDP growth either negatively or positively.  
The growth equations above include three additional independent variables, 
which have not usually been included in earlier empirical growth literature. They are 
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investment ratios, secondary school enrollment rates, export ratios, and FDI ratios. 
The neoclassical growth theory identifies these variables as important determinants 
of growth. Increases in the investment ratios will expand capital available per capita, 
the higher secondary school enrollment rates will indicate the higher skill level of 
the population and total productivity, and the rising export ratio and FDI ratio will 
increase not only availability of resources needed for investment, but also  
technological diffusion (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Barro, Mankiw, and Sal-i-
Martin, 1995; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990; and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997). 
Therefore, their inclusion in the growth equations will reduce the potential bias in 
the estimation of coefficients by limiting the omitted variables, and these variables 
are expected to show positive effects on growth.  
The sign of the Aid variable (Ai/GDP) in this study is uncertain in view of the 
hot debate among development economists and the varying results of existing 
empirical studies. However, the sign of the aid square variable would be negative, as 
several previous studies show. An ever increasing amount of aid beyond the 
absorptive capacity of the recipient countries would result in a diminishing return to 
aid on economic growth. 
The main focus of the growth equations in this study is the interactive terms. As 
in earlier studies, especially by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar 
(2002), the growth equations above include an interactive term between aid and 
policy: (Aid/GDP)*CPIA. In addition, they include an interactive term between aid 
and institutional quality: (Aid/GDP)*ICRG. The rationale for these interactive terms 
is that aid may not be effective by itself, but may become effective in a sounder 
policy and institutional quality environment. For the same reason, the growth 
equations of this study include an interactive term between aid and PD. Aid may not 
be effective by itself; however, as the OECD has stated, aid would become effective 
with an increasing level of the PD indicators, as PD is a part of sound policies and 
institutions. Therefore the interactive term would show a positive sign. 
In growth equation (1), the PD is a simple average of the five-PD principle 
indicators, representing the degree of: (i) ownership of aid recipients (PD-1); (ii) 
alignment of donor’s aid with recipient’s development strategy, investment 
programs, and public finance and procurement systems (PD-2); (iii) harmonization 
of aid programs and activities among donors (PD-3); (iv) result-orientation of aid 
management by both donors and recipients (PD-4); and (v) mutual accountability 
between donors and recipients (PD-5). Like policy and institution variables in the 
earlier studies, this Paris Declaration Index variable is expected to have positive 
effects on per capita income. 
In growth equation (2), the PD is disaggregated into five subcomponents, 
 Development Effectiveness of the Paris Declaration: An Empirical Evaluation 77 
 
following the five principles of the Paris Declaration. Both the composite PD Index 
and five disaggregated PD Indexes are drawn from the “Aid Effectiveness 2005~ 
2010: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration” (OECD, 2011), which was 
prepared by the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. The report is 
based on the findings of the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, 
which was conducted with support from donor organizations, participating country 
governments, and civil society organizations regarding the 12 monitoring indicators 
of the Paris Declaration in each of the participating countries. A total of 78 countries 
and territories participated in the 2011 survey, compared with 55 countries in 2008 
and 34 countries in 2006 surveys. The data are expressed in percentages; however, 
some monitoring indicators (1, 2a, 2b, and 11) are assessed on an alphabetic or 
numeric scale, which are converted into percentages for consistency and 
comparability in this study, as follows: “A” = 90%, “B” =80%, “C” =70%, “D” = 
60%, and “E” =50%. Likewise, “4.5” =90%, “4” =80%, “3.5” =70%, “3” =60%, 
“2.5” =50%, “2” =40%, and “1.5” =30%.     
The growth equations as specified above can be estimated by several 
econometric methods, such as pooled OLS, Fixed Effect, Random Effect, and 
Hausman-Taylor analyses. The pooled OLS analysis can be biased due to 
unobserved individual factors. Thus, the Fixed and Random Effect analyses would 
be better estimation methods with the cross-section and time-series panel data. The 
Fixed Effect analysis is a more appropriate than the Random Effect analysis when 
the unobserved factors are correlated with explanatory variables. However, the 
Fixed Effect analysis cannot offer estimations for time-invariant variables. The 
Random Effect analysis makes a more efficient estimation when the unobserved 
individual factors are uncorrelated with explanatory variables. Therefore, the 
Hausman-Taylor analysis can be a better alternative. It can not only offer an 
estimation of the coefficient of the time-invariant variables, but also offer an 
efficient estimate even when the unobserved individual factors (ui) are correlated 
with the explanatory variables, as long as the explanatory variables are uncorrelated 
with the idiosyncratic error (eit). Moreover, it has an additional advantage. It can 
estimate the growth equation by controlling potential endogeneity between the 
dependent variable and some explanatory variables, such as the aid variable and the 
interactive terms between aid and policy or institution variables. It can test whether 
the estimation properly excluded those variables as instruments or not with a Chi 
square test.  
The growth equations were estimated, using the data from 78 developing 
countries over the period 2005~2010. Sources for the data are summarized in 
<Appendix Table 1>, and a summary of the statistics is provided in <Appendix 
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Table 2>. Data for the variables included in the growth equations are mostly 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, except for the PD 
index and its subcomponents, which come from the 2011 OECD progress report. 
 
 
Ⅳ. Empirical Test Findings 
 
 
The results of the empirical test are summarized in the following table.  
The overall specification test shows that equation (1) is not a satisfactory 
specification for simultaneous estimation of the variables. The Wald Chi square is 
not sufficiently large enough at the usual levels of significance. In contrast, the 
equation (2) is not rejected by the Wald Chi square test at a low level of significance. 
The only difference between the two growth equations is that while equation (1) 
uses a composite index of the Paris Declaration, equation (2) adopts a disaggregated 
index for each of the five principles of the Paris Declaration. During the estimation 
of equation (2), the CPIA and the interactive term between aid and CPIA variables 
are dropped, possibly due to the high collinearity between CPIA and ICRG.  For 
this reason, equation (1) was estimated again without the CPIA and its interactive 
terms. However, the modified specification (1) again failed to pass the overall 
specification test, as shown in Table 1.   
 
<Table 1> Regression Results 
Dependent variable: growth 
rate of per capita GDP 
Hausman-Taylor analysis method 
Expected sign of 
coefficient 
Independent variables Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 2 
Initial GDP per capita 0 
(0.31) 
-0.004 
(0.77) (-) 
Investment/GDP 0.151 
(1.73)* 
0.46 
(2.83)*** (+) 
Human capital -0.008 
(0.17) 
-0.408 
(3.73)*** (+) 
Export/GDP 0.029 
(0.67) 
0.313 
(2.71)*** (+) 
FDI/GDP -0.025 
(0.24) 
-0.964 
(4.64)*** (+) 
Aid/GDP -1.267 
(1.77)* 
-9.707 
(4.47)*** (+/-) 
(Aid/GDP)2 0.01 
(0.51) 
-0.053 
(2.25)** ( - ) 
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<Table 1> Continued 
Dependent variable: growth 
rate of per capita GDP 
Hausman-Taylor analysis method 
Expected sign of 
coefficient 
Independent variables Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 2 
ICRG -0.87 
(1.35) 
-4.501 
(2.07)** (+) 
ICRG*Aid 
0.11 
(1.24) 
0.43 
(1.95)* (+) 
Population growth -0.909 
(0.85) 
-3.192 
(1.07) (+/-) 
PD -0.016 
(0.58)  (+) 
PD*Aid 
0.006 
(0.76)  (+) 
PD-1  
-0.036 
(0.3) (+) 
PD-2  
-0.602 
(4.37)*** (+) 
PD-3  
0.453 
(4.29)*** (+) 
PD-4  
-0.131 
(1.18) (+) 
PD-5  
0.095 
(0.52) (+) 
Aid*PD-1  
0.009 
(0.95) (+) 
Aid*PD-2  
0.115 
(4.80)*** (+) 
Aid*PD-3  
-0.04 
(4.28)*** (+) 
Aid*PD-4  
-0.017 
(2.67)*** (+) 
Aid*PD-5  
0.018 
(1.87)* (+) 
Constant 8.984 
(1.41) 
83.506 
(3.41)***  
Number of observations 79 54  
Overall specification test Wald chi
2(12)=12.02 
Prob > chi2=0.4443 
Wald chi2(20)=122.80 
Prob > chi2=0.0000  
Over-identification test Chi
2(7)=9.43 
Prob > chi2(7)=0.2231 
Chi2(11)=11.67 
Prob > chi2(11)=0.3888  
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses are z-value. 
2) *, **, *** represent the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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The estimation of equation (2) without the CPIA and its interactive term with the 
aid variable passed not only the Wald Chi square test for a simultaneous estimation, 
but also the over-identification test. For an instrumental variable estimation, this 
study uses aid and its interaction with institution (ICRG) and five disaggregated 
Paris Declaration indexes as instruments since these variables may have endogeneity 
problems with the dependent variable, i.e., growth of GDP per capita. In other words, 
while the growth rate of income may be explained by the aid and its interactive 
terms, they may also be influenced by the growth rate of income. The over-
identification Chi square test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the excluded 
instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term and correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. Therefore, this study’s designation of the aid 
and its interactive terms as instruments is entirely proper. The over-identification 
test also shows that this study’s estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity in the 
errors.     
The estimation result of equation (2) shows that the variations in the growth rate 
of GDP per capita are explained significantly by all the determinants that are 
traditionally mentioned in the growth literature, except the initial GDP per capita. 
Investment and export variables have positive effects on growth of GDP per capita. 
However, human capital and FDI variables have negative effects on growth in this 
data set. FDI is possibly in a substitutional relationship with aid. 
The coefficient on the institution variable (ICRG) is significant but negative, 
contrary to our expectation. However, its interactive term with aid is positive, which 
means that aid alone has negative effects on growth, but when aid is given to 
countries with good institutions and effective government, aid has positive effects on 
growth of per capita income. In other words, aid effectiveness is conditional on the 
level of institutions and governance. This finding is consistent with World Bank 
(1998), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Collier and Dollar (2002) studies. 
The (Aid/GDP) and its square variables have a negative sign. Therefore, although 
aid does not appear to have positive effects on economic growth, aid does have a 
diminishing return, which is consistent with the earlier studies (Burnside and Dollar, 
2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 
2002). However, overall net effects of aid on economic growth should be assessed 
not on the basis of the sign of the (Aid/GDP) variable alone, but the marginal impact 
of aid on growth (Ga), which can be derived from equation (2) (on the basis of 
estimated significant coefficients only), as follows: 
Ga = -9.707 +2 * (-0.053) (Aid/GDP) + 0.43 (ICRG) + 0.115 (PD-2)  
+ (-0.04) (PD-3) + (-0.017) (PD-4) + 0.018 (PD-5)                  (3) 
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Aid can affect growth not only independently, but also in interaction with other 
policy/institution variables. If we take the average value of the variables in equation 
(3) from <Appendix Table 2>, the marginal impact of aid on growth is negative. 
Therefore, aid has negative effects on growth of GDP per capita. This finding is 
congruent with Ovaska (2003), but different from Hansen and Tarp (2000 and 2001). 
This may imply that aid has not been allocated to the countries that are capable of 
using the aid effectively for economic growth, and/or aid has not been applied to the 
sectors or programs, so as to be used productively for growth of per capita income. 
Or it may mean that aid has simply substituted for domestic resources used before 
the aid came in, and therefore no net additional resources have been invested for 
growth of the recipient economy as a whole (i.e., aid fungibility). These 
interpretations are consistent with the findings of the earlier studies by Easterly 
(2003), Heller (2005), Rajan and Subramanian (2005), and Lee (2012a and b).   
Among the disaggregated Paris Declaration Indicators, the coefficient of PD-2 
(donors’ aid aligned with recipient’s development strategy and programs), which has 
a negative sign, and PD-3 (harmonization among donors), which has a positive sign, 
is statistically significant. PD-1 (setting up development strategy and programs by 
recipients), PD-4 (result-based aid management by donors and recipients), and PD-5 
(mutual accountability between donors and recipients) have statistically insignificant 
coefficients.  
However, when these PD indicators interact with aid, (Aid*PD-2) and (Aid*PD-5) 
have positive effects on growth of per capita income, and (Aid*PD-3) and (Aid*PD-
4) have small but negative effects on growth of per capita income. (Aid*PD-1) is 
statistically insignificant. This means that in promoting growth of per capita income, 
it is extremely important to have aid aligned with recipient country’s development 
strategy and operational programs, making use of recipient’s public finance 
management and procurement systems, and mutually accountable mechanisms by 
both recipients and donors. This finding is consistent with the OECD progress report 
(2011). It reports that only one item in PD-2 out of 12 monitoring indicators of the 
Paris Declaration has been achieved during 2005~2010 period; less clear and 
consistent progress has been attained in the rest of PD-2 and PD-3 indicators; and 
the least progress has been made in PD-4 and PD-5 indicators.  
Also, this study shows that setting up development strategy and programs by 
recipients (PD-1) alone or establishing sound public finance management and 
procurement system (PD-2) alone is insufficient to make any positive effects on 
growth of income. However, when the recipient’s development agenda and public 
sector management systems are supported by aid (i.e., PD-2*Aid/GDP), they make 
positive effects on growth of per capita income. The same can be said on the mutual 
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accountability (PD-5*Aid/GDP). Therefore, OECD’s statement that the Paris 
Declaration principles are effective in promoting aid to make contributions to 
economic growth is only partially supported by the data set of this study. 
 
 
V. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
Although aid has been conceived as one of the most powerful policy tools for 
growth and poverty reduction in developing countries, its effectiveness has been 
challenged and debated for a long time. However, ever since the Paris Declaration 
was adopted by some 180 representatives of developed and developing country 
governments and international development organizations in 2005, it has been 
touted by OECD as the most appropriate principles and practices to make aid more 
effective in developing countries. Although more than eight years have passed since 
the Paris Declaration was adopted, there has been no rigorous analysis to evaluate its 
empirical impact on development. This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature. 
Using the data collected by the OECD/DCD working party from 78 developing 
countries over the period 2005~2010, this study has analyzed the role played by the 
Paris Declaration principles alone and in interaction with aid in promoting growth of 
per-capita GDP of the sampled countries. The analysis shows that the overall net 
impact of aid on economic growth of developing countries has been negative, but 
that aid effectiveness has been enhanced by sound institutions and some principles 
of the Paris Declaration. The five PD indicators alone had some mixed effects on 
economic growth. However, when they interact with aid, some of them enabled aid 
to have positive effects on economic growth. In particular, the alignment and, to 
some extent, the mutual accountability principles did play a significant and positive 
role in making aid more effective for economic growth of developing countries. 
Regarding the rest of the PD indicators, however, there is no positive evidence that 
they promote aid effects on economic growth in aid recipient countries.  
 These results contrast sharply with the Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Hansen 
and Tarp (2000 and 2001) studies, but are congruent to some extent with the 
findings of earlier studies (World Bank, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier 
and Dollar, 2002) in the sense that aid effectiveness has been promoted by sound 
institutions and policies including some principles of the Paris Declaration.  
The ineffectiveness of some principles of the Paris Declaration challenges the 
prominent role given to policies and institutions for economic growth in the 
literature (Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 2005; Rodrik et al., 2004; Collier and 
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Dollar, 2002; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Conceptually and theoretically speaking, 
it is persuasive to hypothesize that the Paris Declaration enhances aid effectiveness 
in promoting economic growth. Empirically, however, this study can confirm only 
partial evidence for this hypothesis. There may be several reasons for this 
discrepancy and shortcoming.  
First, the six-year period covered in this study may be too short for the PD to 
make any visible impact on aid effectiveness. Second, progress made in 
implementing the Paris Declaration may have been too modest to make any 
significant and broad impact on aid effectiveness. Among the targets set for the 12 
PD indicators, only one (alignment) was fully met, and all the other targets were 
attained only moderately (OECD, 2011). Third, the Paris Declaration itself may be 
deficient in some manner. As indicated in the literature review above, neither the 
Declaration nor its PD indicators include any principles or targets related to rational 
or optimal allocations of aid by recipient countries, sectors, or programs.  
It is therefore recommended that to address the first possibility mentioned above, 
new empirical studies to evaluate the Paris Declaration’s role in enhancing aid 
effectiveness be launched again after more time has elapsed. In the meantime, both 
aid donors and recipient countries should make stronger efforts to implement the 
principles and indicators of the Paris Declaration. Finally, partners of the Paris 
Declaration should expand its scope to include some policies or principles related to 
optimal aid allocations to ensure that aid are placed to the right countries, sectors, 
and programs that can use it effectively for economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Recently, it appears that, both developed and developing countries, as well as 
international development organizations and NGOs, are arguably being too hasty in 
planning future international development cooperation. Rather than focusing on 
attaining or exceeding the targets of the Paris Declaration and then assessing their 
effectiveness on economic growth and development, the 2011 Busan Consensus 
forged a new global agreement for international development cooperation and aimed 
to improve effectiveness and coherence of all development policy tools 
simultaneously (such as resource mobilization, service delivery, foreign direct 
investment, trade, environmental protection, anti-climate changes, institutional 
changes, private sector development, recovery from economic downturns, food 
security, fuel price control, and future shocks prevention). The scope of the agenda 
goes much beyond effective aid management and seems much broader and more 
ambitious than what is warranted by the achievement record of the Paris Declaration 
to date. To promote development effectiveness, it is required to conceive policies 
broadly; however, a more focused action is recommended to make aid effective first. 
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<Appendix Table 1> Data Sources 
Variable Explanation Source URL 
Growth rate of real 
GDP per capita 
Growth rate of GDP per capita in 
current US dollar deflated by US 
GDP deflator 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
Initial GDP per capita GDP per capita in 2005 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
Investment/GDP 
Gross capital formation 
(% of GDP) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS 
Human capital 
Secondary school enrollment 
rates 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR 
Aid/GDP 
Net ODA received 
(% of GNI) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS 
Export/GDP 
Exports of goods and services 
(% of GDP) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS 
FDI/GDP 
Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS 
Population growth Population growth (annual %) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW 
CPIA 
Sum of the four CPIA clusters 
(Range 4~16) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.STRC.XQ/countries 
ICRG 
The PRS Group, Inc. indicators 
of bureaucracy quality (Range 
0~4), corruption (0~6), and law 
and order (0~6) 
http://www.prsgroup.com/prsgroup_shoppingcart/p-75-icrg-
historical-data.aspx 
PD-1 Ownership http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf 
PD-2 Alignment http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf 
PD-3 Harmonization http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf 
PD-4 Result-oriented framework http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf 
PD-5 Mutual accountability http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf 
aPDI (Paris 
Declaration Indicator) 
Average of PD-1, PD-2, PD-3, 
PD-4, PD-5 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf 
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<Appendix Table 2> Sample Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
GDP PC growth 229 3.59896 3.265002 -6.63703 20.24291 
Initial GDP PC 231 1392.111 1413.518 109.7554 6321.993 
Investment/GDP 192 23.90247 7.446886 8.91287 61.46868 
Human capital 163 56.44681 26.67882 9.82571 107.4882 
Export/GDP 206 33.42307 15.90339 9.75318 87.06688 
FDI/GDP 228 5.208526 6.514902 -2.49885 45.92072 
Aid/GDP 226 11.10846 17.38031 -0.17302 176.83 
(Aid/GDP)2 226 424.1364 2358.424 0.029936 31268.87 
ICRG 150 6.531944 1.612728 2 10 
Aid*ICRG 149 53.33513 96.74887 -1.38417 906.254 
Population growth 231 1.837291 1.004582 -0.73279 4.815569 
aPDI (PD indicators) 210 56.14684 11.93232 16.06667 95 
Aid*PD 206 646.2158 793.6187 -11.0993 6754.908 
PD-1 167 70 7.838736 50 90 
PD-2 203 52.25474 15.01455 6.2 80.8 
PD-3 174 38.44109 12.09355 10 95 
PD-4 160 54.65625 28.27405 0 100 
PD-5 169 67.75148 6.612381 50 80 
Aid*PD-1 166 872.7473 1166.929 -10.3812 10609.8 
Aid*PD-2 200 572.6533 589.8842 -11.7654 4067.091 
Aid*PD-3 170 455.2482 741.5616 -7.39664 6365.882 
Aid*PD-4 147 630.5077 676.1905 -13.8417 3491.996 
Aid*PD-5 168 846.703 1248.471 -12.1115 12378.1 
 
 
 
 
